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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this paper is to identify the main determinants of the risk premium in some European 
currency markets just before the EMU. To that extent, we start from Lucas (1982) exchange rate model 
and derive an analytical expression for the forward premium. This expression includes money and 
production variables and it is quite standard, except for the inclusion of macroeconomic policy risk. 
Under some standard assumptions, this formula simplifies substantially and becomes amenable to 
regression analysis. Then, using standard measures of money and production, as well as interest rate 
swaps as indicators of macroeconomic policy risk, the theoretical expression is estimated. We provide 
evidence suggesting that it is policy uncertainty, much more than fundamental macroeconomic 
uncertainty, which determined risk premium over the convergence process to the euro. Whether these 
results can be extended to similar experiences for other currency unions remains open for future 
research.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n intense research effort has been paid in recent years to characterize the determinants of excess returns in 
the forward market for exchange rates [see Hodrick, 1987 and Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992, among many 
others]. As a consequence, significant progress has been made in identifying the factors that lead to the 
presence of a risk premium in exchange rates, although characterizing how its size changes over time remains an open 
question. 
 
A variety of approaches have been used to analyze excess returns in forward contracts for exchange rates. First, 
portfolio selection models assume that the risk premium depends on the supply of assets and the risk aversion of investors 
(Frankel, 1982). A second approach is embedded into intertemporal asset valuation models, developed after Lucas (1982), 
that establish a link between financial markets and markets for consumption commodities. Along this latter line, Hansen 
and Hodrick (1983), Kaminsky and Peruga (1990) and Hu (1997) show that the exchange rate is a function of the 
fundamental variables in the model, money supply and output or real income. In equilibrium, the excess return in the 
currency market is determined by the preferences of private agents and the volatility of the fundamental variables in the  
 
economy. Finally, a third approach suggests that the excess return is related to the so-called 'peso problem'
1
 (Krasker, 1980, 
Borensztein, 1987, Lewis, 1988 and Kaminsky and Peruga, 1991). Agents may have solid expectations of a future change 
in policy which will affect the exchange rate, although the timing of that change is uncertain. Then, the 'peso' effect will 
materialize, even if the change in policy never arises. 
 
                                                          
1  The 'peso problem' name originated from studies made on the Mexican peso at the beginning of the 70s. Traders in currency markets 
anticipated a devaluation, and for some time the peso was being sold at a discount in forward markets, even though the government 
maintained its value until 1976. This effect made the forward exchange rate to deviate from being an unbiased predictor of future spot 
exchange rate over that period of time. 
A 
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This paper is a new attempt to identify the determinants of the risk premium in the currency market. Specifically, 
our work is motivated by the transition period to the European currency and the many episodes of increased uncertainty on 
the success of that process as well as on the specific currencies which would form the European monetary union. The effect 
of uncertainty on each currency was different, depending on the macroeconomic conditions of their respective countries, 
leading to speculative attacks against the weakest currencies in the European Monetary System (EMS). Between 1992 and 
1998, macroeconomic uncertainty affected the level of risk on different currencies. Our goal is to present and test a model 
explaining the determinants of risk premium in currency markets as an explicit function of the amount of uncertainty 
observed by private agents. 
 
We start by developing a theoretical model to identify two possible sources of macroeconomic uncertainty. This 
extends previous work by combining the second and third approaches mentioned above. Using the setup in Hu (1997), we 
establish the relationship between the excess return in forward contracts and the volatility of money supply and output. 
That way, we can measure the effect of fundamental macroeconomic uncertainty on the risk premium in the exchange rate. 
Additionally, we incorporate into the model another relevant source of uncertainty, emerging from anticipations of changes 
in macroeconomic policy. We want to capture the historical perception that some countries in the EMS would have to 
introduce some policy changes to control inflation and government deficit in order to eventually gain access to the 
European currency. Specifically, changes in government expenditure policy could have a nontrivial effect on aggregate 
demand and relative prices. The perception that there was a nonzero probability that such changes would have to be 
introduced increased the uncertainty on the currency exchange rate for those countries. 
 
We test this risk premium model, which incorporates the two mentioned sources of uncertainty, considering 
bilateral exchanges between the French franc, Sterling pound, Spanish peseta, all with the Deutsche mark. Our results show 
that the bigger explanatory power is attained for the post-1994 period, once the national parliaments approved the 
convergence criteria to the common European currency. Furthermore, it is uncertainty on macroeconomic policy which 
exhibits a more systematic explanatory power for the exchange rate risk premium, with uncertainty on the fundamentals of 
the economy playing a minor role.  
 
Three western European countries in the EMS, UK, Demark and Sweden, have not yet adopted the euro. Besides, 
the European Union is in the process of expanding to incorporate 11 new Eastern European countries as new members. 
Hence, although we use the initial convergence process to the euro as an illustration, our methodology can be used to 
analyze possible exchange rate risk premium in these countries. A similar analysis could also be applied if common 
currency areas in Latin America or South East Asia are eventually approved.  
 
In the second section we develop the theoretical model, and explain how to produce an analytical expression for 
the forward exchange risk premium from the Euler condition on aggregate consumption. In the third section we describe a 
particular model by specifying private agents preferences and the stochastic behavior of the main variables, to derive an 
analytical expression for the risk premium allowing for statistical tests to be performed. In the fourth section we estimate 
the equation for the risk premium and characterize the role of uncertainty. In the fifth section we present the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
We consider a dynamic, general equilibrium model similar to that Lucas (1982). From the intertemporal Euler 
condition for consumption we derive expressions for equilibrium spot and forward exchange rates. Finally, these 
expressions are used to characterize excess returns in exchange markets and the corresponding risk premium in forward 
rates.  
 
The model considers two countries (domestic and foreign) and two perishable commodities, x
D
 and x
F
. In each 
country, a different currency is used to pay for transactions in their respective commodities. Each period t, the domestic 
(foreign) country receives a stochastic endowment Yt
D
 (Yt
F
) of good x
D
 (x
F
), and zero units of the other commodity. Each 
country also receives a stochastic endowment Mt
D
 and Mt
F
 of its currency, so that Rt=(Yt
D
, Yt
F
) defines the state vector of 
real endowments while Nt=(Mt
D
, Mt
F
) defines the state vector of nominal endowments. Over time, real endowments and 
money stocks obey a multivariate stochastic process to be specified below.  
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All consumers are identical in each country. The model is written from the perspective of the domestic country. 
The representative consumer has preferences characterized by: 
s-t D F U( , )       0 <  < 1c cEt is is
s=t


  
  (1) 
where cis
D
, cis
F
 represent the consumption levels of the domestic and foreign goods by the representative agent of country i 
over period s. We assume the utility function U(., .) to be bounded, continuously differentiable, increasing in both 
arguments and strictly concave,  being a constant time discount factor.  
 
For simplicity, we consider preferences to be symmetric over both commodities, although that is not needed for 
the empirical analysis below. In equilibrium, agents will try to diversify risk by consuming half of the endowments in each 
country, so a pooling equilibrium will be reached. In such an equilibrium, the relative price, pR, of x
F
 in terms of x
D
 when 
measured in units of x
D
 per each unit of x
F
, i.e., the real exchange rate, is obtained from Euler conditions, 
D F
t tF
Rt D F
t tD
( /2 , /2)U Y Y
 = p
( /2 , /2)U Y Y
  (2) 
being equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption across commodities, and independent from nominal 
variables. 
 
We assume that each economy is subject to cash in advance constraints. At the beginning of each period, 
consumers receive the endowment of currency in their own country. Since money does not produce any utility by itself, 
consumers will spend it to purchase the consumption commodities. However, to be able to purchase the foreign good, they 
first need to exchange currency through either spot or forward contracts at their corresponding equilibrium prices. From 
money market equilibrium, nominal prices must satisfy: 
D D D( , ) =  /  NP R M Yt t t t
F F F ( , ) =  /  NP R M Yt t t t
  (3) 
which represent the well-known equations from the quantitative theory of money demand under a unit velocity of 
circulation of money.  
 
Using the definition for the real exchange rate in (2) and (3) we can obtain the expression for the equilibrium spot 
exchange rate (in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) satisfying the absence of arbitrage condition in 
the international market for goods (purchasing power parity) 
D D F D F
t t t tFt
t RtF F D D F
t t t tDt
P   (  /  2,  /  2)UM Y Y Y
 =   = .  pS
  (  /  2,  /  2)P UM Y Y Y
 (4) 
 
Equation (4) is typical of monetary models of exchange rate determination, where the exchange rate depends 
positively on the money supply and negatively on the real endowment of the own country, with relationships of opposite 
sign for the foreign country.  
 
As an alternative, currency exchange can take place through forward contracts, which allow consumers to insure 
themselves against the uncertainty on the future purchasing power of their own currencies. We will assume that these 
contracts last a single period, being purchased at the end of each period. Hence, forward contracts determine the 
distribution of currency for the following period. To obtain the forward exchange rate (in units of domestic currency per 
units of foreign currency), we use an arbitrage condition similar to the covered interest rate parity.  
 
Let us first consider the period t price bt of a contract guaranteeing with certainty a unit of domestic currency at 
time t+1. The amount of commodity x
D
t+1 that can be purchased with a unit of domestic currency at time t+1 is the inverse 
of its price, which given the monetary and real endowments in the domestic country every period and the cash in advance 
restrictions, it is given by, 
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D
t+1 D
t+1D D
t+1 t+1t+1
1 Y
 =  = 
 ( , )NP R M
   (5) 
 
 At the margin, the utility from each of the πDt+1 units of x
D
 is given by UD(2Y
D
t+1,2Y
F
t+1), which must be 
discounted by β to obtain its equivalent in terms of time  t utility. So, the price in real terms of that contract, should be 
equal to the amount of commodity xt
D
 producing at time t the same expected discounted utility than πDt+1 units of 
commodity x
D
t+1 consumed at time t+1, Et[β π
D
t+1 UD(2Y
D
t+1,2Y
F
t+1)] /UD(2Y
D
 t,2Y
F
t). Finally, the conversion to nominal 
units of the price of the contract is achieved by multiplying that real quantity times the price P
D
(Rt, Nt), or dividing by its 
inverse, πDt. Hence, the price in domestic currency of a contract paying with certainty a unit of domestic currency at time 
t+1 is: 
1 1 1
1
1 1
,
2 2
1 1
,
2 2
D F D
D t t t
D D
t t t t
D F D
D t t t
U
= E   = E  
U
Y Y
b q
Y Y
 

  

  
  
       
    
 (6) 
where qt+1 denotes the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption corrected by relative prices. 
 
Similarly, we can compute the price in foreign currency of a contract paying with certainty one unit of foreign 
currency at time t+1. Using the absence of intertemporal arbitrage condition on commodity x
F
, the price of that contract is, 
1 1 1
1
1 1
,
2 2
1 1
,
2 2
D F F
F t t t
F F
t t t t
D F F
F t t t
U
 = E   = E  
U
Y Y
b q
Y Y
 

  

  
  
       
    
 (7) 
where qt+1
F
 , is the analogue marginal rate of substitution corrected by relative prices, and πFt is the purchasing power of a 
unit of foreign currency in terms of x
F
 at t. 
 
Let us now consider two alternative investment strategies. The first one invests one unit of domestic currency on 
the riskless contract in that currency, with a risk-free return of 1/bt
D
. The second strategy reproduces the covered 
purchasing power parity of interest rates by converting the domestic currency to foreign currency at the current exchange 
rate, 1/St, inverting that amount in a risk-free contract in that currency, with a return equal to 1/bt
F
, to finally convert to 
domestic currency the proceeds of that investment through forward currency contracts at price Ft
t+1
. In the absence of any 
risk other than the one emerging form the stochastic nature of endowments, investors must be indifferent between these 
two strategies, so that the absence of arbitrage condition implies the equivalence,  
1t
t
D F
t t t
F1
 = 
S  b b

  (8) 
 
 Using (6) and (7) to eliminate bt
D
 and bt
F
, we can obtain the expression for the equilibrium forward exchange rate: 
1
1
F
t t
t D
t t
t+1 = SF t
E q
E q


  
  
  (9) 
 
Finally, we can characterize the risk premium in the foreign currency market by comparing expected returns from 
investments in foreign currency through spot and forward contracts. Taking conditional expectations on the future spot rate 
St+1 at (4) and subtracting the value of the forward rate Ft
t+1
 from (9), we obtain the excess return in forward contracts, 
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     
F
D F D F
t t+1t+1 t+1 t tt+1
t t t t+1 tt+1 t+1 tR RF D F D D
t+1 t+1 t t t t+1
 qE  M Y M Y
 -  =  .  ,  - . .  ,p pS N NE F E R R
   M Y M Y qE
    
      
 (10) 
 
 Equation (10) shows that the expected excess return from a forward contract is determined by real and monetary 
variables, as well as by the preferences of the representative agents. These enter in (10) through the real exchange rate, pR, 
and qt
F
, qt
D
. According to (2), (6) and (7), parameters in the utility function will determine the way how shocks in real and 
nominal endowments affect the risk premium. The risk premium emerges because of the fundamental uncertainty in the 
model, the uncertainty linked to the stochastic behavior of the economy. We want to bring into the model another source of 
uncertainty, related to the implementation of macroeconomic policy. To that extent, we now introduce the government in 
our model. 
 
Let us suppose that there is in the domestic country a government which finances its expenditures through lump-
sum taxes. Expenditures are defined as a constant fraction of real endowment, Gt = δtYt, where δt may vary over time. The 
only effect of public expenditures is to reduce the level of resources available for the private sector to a level of (1-δt)Yt. By 
convenience, we will assume that the government collects taxes from its citizens once prices have been determined, but 
before commodities are exchanged between the two countries.
2
 As a consequence, in the previous expressions (1-δt)Yt must 
substitute Yt. The expression for the risk premium would then be given by (10), with state vectors now being defined as: R t 
= [(1-δ t)Y
D
t, Y
F
t], Rt+1 = [(1-δt+1)Y
D
t+1,Y
F
 t+1]. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
The characterization of risk premium in (10) is very general, and some additional structure must be introduced 
prior to testing the theory. We now incorporate into the model three assumptions which lead to a testable analytical 
formulation for the risk premium. First, we alter slightly the concept of risk premium, to avoid some practical difficulties. 
Secondly, we specify the preferences of the representative consumer, since they play a central role in the determination of 
the risk premium. Finally, we make some assumptions on the stochastic behavior of the variables in the model. 
 
3.1. Redefining The Risk Premium 
 
The definition of risk premium in (10) is not invariant to changes in the units of measurement. Specifically, it is 
subject to Siegel paradox, as a consequence of Jensen’s inequality. The value of the risk premium emerging from this 
expression is different depending on whether we measure the exchange rate in units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency (St), or the reverse (1/St). To avoid this problem, it is standard in the literature to use a definition of risk 
premium that incorporates a logarithmic transformation, since then the change of units only affects the sign of the risk 
premium: Et [ln(1/St+1)] = -E t [ln(St+1)]. If we represent by st+1 the log of St+1/St (the depreciation rate of the domestic 
currency), and by ft
t+1
 the log of Ft
t+1
/St (the depreciation rate of the exchange rate insurance or forward premium), we can 
define the new measure of risk premium as Et [st +1 - ft
t+1
]. Using the approximation ln (1+x) x for a small x, this measure 
is related to the risk premium in (10) through: Et [st+1-ft
t+1
]  Et [(St+1-Ft
t+1
)/St]. Therefore, the new formulation of the risk 
premium is approximately equal to the excess return in the forward rate, as a percentage.  
 
3.2. Consumer Preferences  
 
As a standard illustration, we assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
 3
 
 
 
   
 
0
D F
it it
D F
it it
1-
  c   c
U c , c =     0 1    y 1
1 -
1-
 
  


   
 
  
 (11) 
                                                          
2 Depending on the timing of exchanges, fiscal policy might affect prices and produce asymmetries in consumption in both countries.  
3  Strictly speaking, a Cobb-Douglas utility is compatible with a pooling equilibrium solution only when  = ½. 
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where v is the risk aversion parameter. Using this function into expression (4) for the spot exchange rate and taking into 
account macroeconomic policy, we obtain the depreciation rate for domestic currency,
 4 
 
 
11 1 1
D F
tt t t
D F
t t t t
-1
1 -
  =    
1 -
S M M
S M M


  
 
 
 
  (12) 
 
Because of the homogeneity of the Cobb-Douglas function and our choice of a pooling equilibrium solution, the 
vector of states for real endowments does not enter into this expression, with economic policy showing up through 1-δt. 
Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, real endowments affect the relative price and the price index equally but with an 
opposite sign, so that their effects on the spot rate cancel out. On the contrary, the macroeconomic policy variable δt affects 
just the relative price through the effect of real endowment on marginal utility. By construction, this variable does not 
influence the price index, which depends on global endowments Yt
D
, Yt
F
.
5
  
 
To obtain a similar expression for forward exchange rates, we must use the Cobb-Douglas utility function in 
equations (6) and (7), which characterize the mathematical expectations of the price corrected marginal rates of 
intertemporal substitution in the two currencies, Et[q
F
t+1], E t[q
D
t+1], whose ratio is, according to (9) the forward premium, 
(1- ) (1- ) (1- )(1- ) -1
D F F
t+1 t+1 t+1t+1
t D F FFt+1
t t tttt t+1
D ( -1)- (1- ) (1- )(1- )
D F
t t t+1 t+1 t+1t+1
t D F
t tt
1- Y Y M
     E
1- Y Y M[ ]q EF
 =  = 
[ ]qS E 1- Y Y
    E
1- Y Y
     
     




        
        
        
    
   
  
-1
D
t+1
D
t
 
M
M
   
    
     
 (13) 
 
Finally, we would take the conditional expectation in (12) and subtract the previous expression to obtain the risk 
premium, as defined in section 3.1, Et[St+1/St] - Ft
t+1
/St .But before we obtain a tractable expression for the risk premium, it 
is necessary to make some assumptions on the joint stochastic behavior of real and nominal endowments, which relate to 
the fundamental uncertainty, as well as on the probability distribution of fiscal variable δt, which is related to policy 
uncertainty. 
 
3.3. The Stochastic Process For The Main Variables 
 
 The risk premium depends on conditional expectations of cross products of random variables. Under general 
conditions, these products do not have a well defined probability distribution which might allow for computing their 
expectations, and we need to incorporate some restrictions on the stochastic behavior of the main variables in the model. 
That will also allow us to find a formulation for the risk premium as a function of the main sources of uncertainty in the 
economy.  
 
                                                          
4
  Cole and Obstfeld (1991) show that the efficient allocations of resources in an economy like the one considered in this paper is of the 
form: 
(1 )1 1
(1 )1 1
D D D D
c Y c Yt tDt Ft
F F F F
c Y c Yt tDt Ft
 
 
   
   
 
It is simple to see that when these consumption expressions are plugged into (6) proportionality factors in the consumption rules cancel 
out, leading exactly to the same expression (12). That means that, so long as countries are following efficient consumption allocations, 
the exchange rate will be determined by the same fiscal and monetary policy indicator that appear in (12).
 
5  Let us assume that real and nominal endowments, Y, M, are constant for the two countries. According to (3), this implies that the price 
indices PD, PF, will also be constant. An increase in the proportion defining public expenditures, δt+1 > δt will reduce the amount x of 
commodity available for private consumption, thereby reducing the relative price of xF, pR. Hence, the spot exchange rate decreases, 
producing a appreciation in the domestic currency. 
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We will assume independence between fundamental uncertainty and macroeconomic policy uncertainty. With 
regard to fundamental uncertainty, we will assume, as in Hu (1992),  that, conditional on available information, growth 
rates in the fundamental variables (m
i
t+1=M
i
t+1/M
i
t, y
i
t+1=Y
i
t+1/Y
i
t; i =D, F) follow a joint lognormal distribution given by:  
 
2
2
/
1
~
log
log
i iii
t ttt
i i i i
t t t t
i
m ym mt
i
t y m y y
I
t
N ,  
m
y



 
                    
 
 
We assume that money supply and production are not correlated between the two countries. Relative to policy 
uncertainty, we will assume policy decisions to be independent of the state of the economy. To represent the stochastic 
behavior of economic policy we follow a similar strategy to that of the so-called Peso problem. The policy indicator δt, i.e,. 
the ratio of domestic public expenditures to the endowment of the own country, Gt = δt Yt
D
, may follow one of two possible 
regimes: δ0, δ1, with δ0>δ1.  
 
Currency risk prior to constitution of the European Union is related to uncertainty on the self-discipline of 
governments to follow rigorous policies. So, we consider governments following initially expansive policies, with δt =δ0, 
and focus on the market estimate of pt =Prob (δt+1 = δ1 / δt = δ0), the probability that there might be a change in policy 
next period, from expansive to restrictive. That would amount to the perception that the government is following the kind 
of rigorous policy that could allow for fulfilling the deficit and debt convergence criteria established in the Maastricht 
agreement. That probability should be expected to change over time as a function of the evolution of some economic 
indicators that agents consider relevant when predicting future policy decisions. The probability that an expansionary state 
lasts for at least one more period is 1-pt= Prob (δt+1 = δo / δt = δ0). The conditional expectation of the economic policy 
indicator, δt+1, is: Et[δt+1] = pt δ1 + (1-pt)δ0, and its variance: Vart (δt+1) =pt(1-pt)( δ1- δ0)
2
. 
 
3.4. Expressions For The Risk Premium 
 
Expression (12) for the depreciation rate of the spot exchange rate can be written,  
 
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
D F
D Ft t t t
t t tD F
t t t t
-1
 S 1
 =   = g  
1
M M
m m
S M M



   
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

 
 
 
 (14) 
 
Where gt+1=(1-δt+1)/(1-δt) is the growth rate of the fraction of real endowments available to the consumer. We will 
have gt+1 = (1-δ1)/(1-δ0) = k, with probability pt (regime change) and gt+1 = (1-δ0)/(1-δ0) = 1 with probability 1-pt (same 
regime).Taking conditional expectations under the previous assumptions,
6
  
       ln ln ln ln ln D F
t+1 t+1
D F
t tt+1 t t+1 t+1t+1 t m m
/  = +  = (k) +g pS S m mE E          (15) 
since the three terms are independent from each other. 
 
Under the stochastic independence between fundamental and policy variables, expression (13) for the forward 
premium becomes: 
     
     
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   
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 (16) 
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Using properties of the lognormal distribution as in Hu (1997), substituting expressions for the conditional 
expectations
7
 and simplifying, we get,
8
 
 exp
exp
(1 )t+1
+ (1 )p p kF t t t
 =  xD Fm m(1- ) 1 t+1 t+1+ (1 )p pS kt t t
1 12 2
D F - + (1 ) (1 )(1 )D Fy yF D m mm m t+1 t+1 t+1 t+12 2t+1 t+1
 
  
      





  
 
 
 
 (17) 
 
Finally, we subtract from (15) expression (17) after taking logs, to analytically characterize the risk premium,  
 
   
1
ln ln
ln ln D F
t+1 t+1
D FD F
t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1
t t tt+1 t+1t
(1 )
t t 2 2
t (1- ) m m
t t
y ym m
 = fs SE E F
  
+(1 )p p 1 1k
 = (k) + -p
+(1 ) 2 2p pk
     (1 ) +(1 )(1 ) .
 
   
    


       
 
  
 
   
 (18) 
 
This expression for the exchange rate risk premium contains a distinct component for each source of uncertainty 
in the theoretical model. The first one, associated to macroeconomic policy uncertainty, is a nonlinear function of pt. To 
better understand the effect on the risk premium of changes in pt, we simulated the 
1
( , , ) ln ln
(1 )
t t
t t (1- )
t t
+(1 )p pk
 f p (k)p
+(1 )p pk
 
 

  
 
     
 
 function and the conditional variance of the binomial distribution chosen 
to represent the stochastic behavior of fiscal policy,      
2
0 1 1 1 0, , var ( ) 1t t t t tg p p p        , for given values of the 
utility function parameters , . Standardized versions of both functions in Figure 19 display a very similar behavior for 
any given value of the risk aversion coefficient, so that the volatility of fiscal policy and the size of the risk premium are 
related to each other. Hence, as a first approximation, it can be assumed that 0   such 
that ( , , ) ( , , ), ( , , )t t tf p g p p             and consider the transformed expression for the risk premium,  
D F
t+1 t+1
D FD F
t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
t+1 2 2 2
t t+1 0 1t t t m m
y ym m
1 1
=   (1 - ) (  - + -f p p )sE
2 2
     (1 ) +(1 )(1 )
    
    
   
   
 (19) 
 
 In this expression, we would expect a positive sign for pt, and a negative sign for p
2
t. The risk premium is zero 
when pt is either 0 or 1, reflecting absolute certainty on the fiscal regime. The effect of pt on the premium reaches its 
maximum value for intermediate values of pt. When pt<1/2, an increase in probability will increase fiscal policy 
uncertainty, with a positive effect on the risk premium, while for pt>1/2, a probability increase would reduce uncertainty 
and the risk premium. 
                                                          
7 
 (1 ) (1 )1 1 tt t tE g k p p
    

     
. 
8
  Following Hu (1997) we assume that there are interactions between the real and nominal variables in a economy, a fact which arises 
in the empirical analysis we perform below. However, it is far from evident that lognormality of log(mt) and log(yt) guarantees that 
their product is also lognormal if this variables are conditionally correlated. In Hodrick (1989) fundamentals are assumed to be 
conditionally uncorrelated. In that case expression (17) would be given by: 
 exp exp
(1 )t+1
+ (1 )p p 1 1kF t 2 2t t
 =   -D F F Dm m(1- ) 1 m mt+1 t+1 2 2+ (1 ) t+1 t+1p pS kt t t
 
    





 
 
 
 
9
 Figures and tables are included in a separated appendix available upon request or on http://www.ucm.es/info/ecocuan/jajm 
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 The second part of the expression reflects the response of the risk premium to business cycle uncertainty, a 
function of the conditional variances of domestic and foreign money supply, 2 2,D F
t+1 t+1m m
    , and their conditional 
covariances with real endowments, .y  mymy F 1+tF 1+tD 1+t
D
1+t
  These terms can be explained through their contribution to the 
volatility of the purchasing power parity of both currencies given the cash in advance constraints. 
 
 An increase in volatility of nominal or real endowments in the domestic country, or a decrease in their covariance, 
increases the volatility of the purchasing power of the domestic currency. Risk averse foreign consumers will then be 
willing to pay a premium to guarantee themselves a future price for the domestic currency through a forward contract, and 
the forward exchange rate, Ft
t+1
, measured in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency will decrease. An 
increase in the volatility of nominal or real endowments for the foreign country or a decrease in their joint covariance 
would have the opposite effects on the forward exchange rate Ft
t+1
, which would then increase. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RISK PREMIUM  
 
To test (19) we use a two step estimation strategy: first, we estimate the probability that convergence takes place 
and we obtain the conditional variances and covariances for the exogenous variables.
 10
 Second, we use that information to 
estimate (19) by OLS, applying standard specification tests. The constant term in the regression acts as a proxy for the set 
of second order conditional moments which are not time varying. Since fundamental variables are measured differently in 
each country, their volatilities are not directly comparable, so it is not possible to estimate the model under the constraints 
imposed by international symmetry. Hence, we only estimate the unrestricted version of the model, which incorporates all 
conditional moments separately. Testing the theory then consists on testing for significance and sign on estimated 
parameters. 
 
4.1. A Proxy For The Probability For A Regime Change 
 
The exchange rate risk premium in (19) depends on the perceived probability of a change from a somewhat loose 
to a more rigorous policy. Even though the probability of a change in regime in the theoretical model, pt, refers just to a 
possible change in the level of public expenditures, we can extend the concept to capture any change in policy which might 
end up affecting either the level or the volatility of fundamental variables.  
 
To substitute for the unobserved convergence probability assigned by the financial markets to the event that the 
country belongs to the EMU by January 1999, we use a procedure similar to JP Morgan EMU calculator. The basic 
feature of the EMU calculator is that the observed interest rate spread at time t, IR_SPR, is supposed to be a weighted 
average of the IN spread, IR_SPR
IN
, which would apply if the country adopts the single currency, and the OUT spread, 
IR_SPR
OUT
, corresponding to the case when the country is out of the EMU. The weights are the corresponding 
probabilities of each event, 
 _ _ 1 _IN OUTt t t t tIR SPR p IR SPR p IR SPR    (20) 
 
In a monetary union, financial instruments from different countries with the same maturity, liquidity and credit 
risk must have the same yield. So, if on January 1999 the country fulfils the convergence criteria
11
 and enters into the 
                                                          
10 
We consider the bilateral relationships between Spanish peseta (SPA), Deutsche mark (DEM), Sterling pound (GBP) and French 
franc (FRF). The sample starts on January 1, 1986, after Spain became a member of the European Economic Community, and ends in 
April 1998 (In May 1998 the European Council announced the countries that would form the euro area on January the 1st, 1999). We use 
monthly data for Spain (SP), Germany (GER), France (FR) and United Kingdom (UK). The industrial production index (IPI) is used as 
indicator of economic activity, and M2 as the monetary aggregate. To compute probabilities of convergence, we use interest rates for 
swaps at 3-year maturities for all countries, over 1992:1 to 1998:04. Finally, spot and forward exchange rates represent the value for the 
last day of the month. Preliminary data analysis (unit root tests and intervention analysis [Box and Tiao (1975)]) shows that all variables, 
but risk premium, are I(1). Therefore, all variables are differenced in the model for the conditional variance. These results are not 
reported here, but are available upon request. 
11
  To enter EMU, the Maastricht Treaty indicates that candidates must lower inflation to within 1.5% of the lowest three in the 
European Community, push budget deficits below 3% of GDP, lower debt-to-GDP ratios to 60%, and maintain a stable currency 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2007                                        Volume 6, Number 3 
 38 
EMU, its riskless interest rate should be equal to those in the other countries in the monetary union. On the other hand, if 
the country does not enter the union, its interest rate will be determined by a variety of factors including its own monetary 
policy and it will generally maintain a positive spread relative to countries in the union. Hence, if IR_SPRt
IN
= 0 and 
IR_SPRt
OUT
 =  > 0 in (20), we can estimate the probability assigned by the financial markets at time t to the event that the 
country belongs to the EMU by January 1999: 
1 _
t tp IR SPR     (21) 
 
In fact, we will later use in estimation a more flexible functional form by taking (21) to suggest a negative 
relationship between the convergence probability and the interest rate swap: 
0 1 _t tp IR SPR     (22) 
then  
2
0 1 0 1(1 ) ( _ ) ( _ )t t t tp p IR SPR IR SPR         
so that (19) becomes a regression equation of the form, 
2
0 1 2
3 4 5 6
ln _ _
D FD FD F
t+1 t+1t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
t+1
t t tt+1
t
2 2
y ym m tm m
S
PRM IR SPR IR SPR +
F
 + + u      
 
     
 
  
 (23) 
with     20 0 0 1 1 0 2 1; 1 ; 1 2 ; ; .
2
0 1h   (  - h h h)                   
 
Which includes the excess return in forward contracts (PRMt), defined as ln(St+1)-ln(Ft
t+1
), as dependent variable, 
projected on a constant and the interest rate spread (IR_SPR) approximating the probability of a change in regime. The 
square value of the proxy for the convergence probability is also included in the model with an expected negative sign as 
discussed above, as opposed to the positive expected sign of IR_SPR. The risk premium expression also includes 
conditional variances  2 2,D F
t+1 t+1m m 
and covariances,  ,D FD F
t+1 t+1t+1 t+1y ym m
    .
12
 
 
The unquestionable participation of Germany in the euro area makes it reasonable to focus the analysis on 
differentials with German interest rates. Therefore, the probability of the country adopting the single currency from the 
outset of the EMU is inversely related to the spread of interest rates with Germany. We consider interest rates from swap 
markets to be more reliable than those from the market for government bonds, which is rather narrow and illiquid in some 
countries. Furthermore, the tax treatment of returns on public debt is different across countries. On the contrary, the swap 
market is very liquid and contracts are standardized across currencies, including the tax treatment of returns, and they are 
not affected by default risk.
13
 Using the spread of 3-year swap rate as a proxy for the probability of convergence is based 
on our belief that it is the maturity most likely to capture expectations of convergence to the euro area for a country. Its 
behavior is similar to those of the 5- and 10-year rates, while the 1-year rate is very influenced by monetary policy 
decisions. 
 
Interest rate spread with Germany and risk premium values for France, Spain and United Kingdom are shown in 
Figure 2, for the 1994:01-1998:04 period. In all cases, the risk premium series is clearly more volatile than the spread. 
Over 1994 and the first part of 1995, the spread increased for Spain, sharply decreasing during 1996, which could reflect a 
                                                          
12 
To estimate conditional variances and covariances we assume real and monetary variables, represented by the money supply and 
industrial production, follow a joint lognormal distribution, and also that their dynamics can be summarized by a VARMA model in 
logged differences with GARCH innovations, which allows us to capture any possible nonlinear dependence among their innovations, as 
proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (1991), among many others. We estimated heteroskedastic effects for 
the money supply in France and the UK and the covariance between money supply and industrial production in France. However, we 
also obtain a statistically significant autoregressive structure for the conditional covariance between both variables in Spain and 
Germany. No conditional heteroskedasticity in the variances of the money supply or industrial production was found for these two 
countries. A detailed explanation of the estimation process is available upon request. 
13
 Extracting market expectations on a given event from asset prices is a question which has recently attracted a great deal of interest 
[see Dillen and Edlund (1997), Favero et al.  (2000), for recent reviews see Söderlind and Svensson (1997), and Bates (1998)].  
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growing probability that this country could adopt the single currency from the beginning. There was a transitory increase at 
the beginning of 1997, the spread returning very quickly to a decreasing path. The spread with France widened in the 
spring of 1995, from zero to about 1 percentage point, remaining at that level until the end of 1996, when it fell back to 
zero. This is consistent with a high probability of this country adopting the single currency from the start. On the other 
hand, the spread shown a rising trend since the beginning of 1994 for the United Kingdom, stabilizing after 1996, but 
without the sharp decrease observed for Spain and France. These graphs suggest that for Spain and France, an increase in 
IR_SPR, i.e. a loss in market confidence, induces an increase in the volatility of the risk premium. However, for the United 
Kingdom, the Figure could conceivably indicate that the United Kingdom was not considered to be a likely participant in 
the EMU, and the correlation between spread and risk premium is more difficult to explain. 
 
4.2. The Effect Of Uncertainty On The Risk Premium  
 
We first present in Table 2 least-squares estimates of (23) for the full sample, 1986:02-1998:04, and for the three 
bilateral relationships without taking into account the effect of uncertainty on policy implementation, so that conditional 
second order moments are the only explanatory variables. This sample exploits all available data on conditional second 
order moments. Using risk premium data corrected from extreme values sharply decreases the evidence of residual 
autocorrelation. R
2
 values are rather low, although estimated parameters show their right sign, when significant, but the 
overall suggestion is that macroeconomic uncertainty may not be the most important factor determining risk premium in 
exchange rates.  
 
Alternatively, we studied the explanatory power of policy uncertainty, as measured by the two spread variables. 
Using the longer available sample for interest rate swaps, 1992:02-1998:04, we obtained a poor fit, probably because of 
including the period prior to formal approval of the Union Treaty. Convergence criteria were adopted in the European 
Union Treaty, which was approved at the European Council celebrated at Maastricht in February 1992, although their final 
approval at the level of the Congress of each country took up to November 1993. Hence, from 1992, governments 
considered the possibility of implementing policy with a goal of achieving convergence, although it is just from 1994 that 
convergence criteria had a formal validity.  
 
When the shorter period, 1994:01 - 1998:04, is considered in Table 3, results become much more satisfactory in 
terms of explanatory power as well as significance and sign of individual coefficients. Simple and adjusted R
2
 coefficients 
fall between 10% and 15%, well above their values for the longer sample. The interest rate spread is statistically significant 
except for the GBP/GEM relationship. In this case, lack of significance seems to be a consequence of colinearity between 
the two interest rate spread variables. A Wald test for joint significance of both variables confirms this result. The sign of 
the coefficients is as expected, except for the GBP/GEM exchange rate, suggesting that the linear probability term would 
not capture adequately all the information regarding the risk premium in that currency. It seems clear that it is only from 
1994 that policy uncertainty becomes a relevant factor in the time evolution of the risk premium for these currencies.  
 
We present in Table 4 the estimation results for the full model, for the 1994:01-1998:04 period, including 
macroeconomic as well as policy uncertainty variables to determine the risk premium. Conditional second order moments 
of fundamental macroeconomic variables are generally not significant. On the contrary, policy uncertainty variables are 
always significant and show the expected sign according to the theoretical model, as explained above. The left column in 
Figure 3 shows, for the1994:01-1998:04 period, the actual exchange risk premium (which was also shown in Figure 2) and 
the fitted value from the model in Table 4. The middle and right columns show the contribution to the fitted risk premium 
of every block of regressors, macroeconomic uncertainty: 3 4 5 6
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
D FD FD F
t+1 t+1t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
2 2
y ym mm m
 + +       , (middle 
column) and fiscal policy 2 3
ˆ ˆ_ _ 2t tIR SPR IR SPR  , (right column). Next, we present, in Figure 5 a scatter 
diagram for the fitted risk premium versus (i) observed exchange risk premium (left column) (ii) the macroeconomic 
uncertainty contribution (middle column)  and (iii) the policy uncertainty contribution (right column).  An inspection of 
these diagrams reveals that the risk premium is extremely volatile and it is more closely related to policy uncertainty than 
to macroeconomic uncertainty. That is also reflected in correlations coefficients between each variables with fitted risk 
premium, which are significantly higher for policy uncertainty (among 0.70 and 0.93) than for the macroeconomic 
uncertainty (among 0.19 and 0.58).  
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The general conclusion is that it is the uncertainty on future policy decisions, much more than that on the 
fundamentals of the economy, which determine the level of the risk premium. Furthermore, this evidence arises only after 
1994, suggesting that it was the formal approval of the Maastricht criteria, more than the Maastricht agreement itself, the 
starting point for the exchange rate markets to incorporate the probability of convergence into the determination of risk 
premium. 
 
4.3.Numerical Estimates Of Convergence Probabilities 
 
The approach we have followed to extract information from the interest rate spread on the probability that a 
country joins the European Monetary Union at April 1999 allows us to estimate the time evolution of these probabilities. 
From the estimation of (23) in Table 4 we can recover estimates
14
 for the probabilities that France, Spain and UK belong to 
the euro area in April 1999. These estimated probabilities of joining the EMU, normalized so that  0, 1tp  , are shown 
in Figure 4. The results look fairly reasonable. For Spain as well as France the value of the indicator rose since of 
beginning of 1996. The upward trend confirms the current perception of an increased probability that Spain and France 
would adopt the single currency from the outset of the EMU. The United Kingdom had a high probability of entering the 
EMU during late 1993, but it collapsed during the general wave of pessimism on the future of a currency union during 
1994. Since then, the probability continuously decreased until the end of 1997, suggesting, as it was finally the case, that 
the likelihood of this country participating in the euro area was not considered to be particularly great. 
  
CONCLUSIONS  
 
We have proposed a general equilibrium model to characterize the risk premium in the exchange rate market as a 
function of economic uncertainty. Our main contribution is the distinction between two types of uncertainty, one 
associated to the cyclical behavior of the economy, the other one produced by anticipation of possible changes in economic 
policy. The later shows up in our estimates as an essential factor in the behavior of financial markets over the convergence 
process to the common European currency. Interest rate spreads and squared spread values, used as proxies for the amount 
of policy uncertainty have an acceptable significant power in the later 1994-1998 period, once national Parliaments 
approved the Maastricht criteria. Regarding fundamental uncertainty, the relevance of conditional variances of money 
supply and industrial production as well as the conditional covariance between these two variables is rather limited, in 
consistency with the results reached by previous authors.There are no significant differences in the behavior of the risk 
premium for the bilateral relationships considered, except in the one involving the sterling pound, most likely due to the 
fact that the UK declined entering the euro zone at an initial stage. 
 
Results in this paper should be taken as a starting point for further research. A more detailed estimation of 
conditional variances and covariances of real and nominal factors in the economy, as well as a better characterization of 
the uncertainty on fiscal policy might be useful towards better explaining risk premium in currency markets. Nonseparable 
preferences would lead to rather complex equilibrium conditions without closed form solution. Numerical solution 
methods that parameterize conditional expectations might allow us to produce simulated time series from which the effects 
of fundamental and policy uncertainty on exchange rate risk premium might be studied. This is left for further research. 
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14  
 From the estimation of (23) in Table 4 we can recover estimates for 0, 1  and h. The system of equations listed in (23) does not 
have an analytical solution and we need to use a numerical method to solve it in MATLAB. Then, from (22) , it is straightforward to 
compute the convergence probabilities  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1:  
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. GARCH Models 
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

 
 SP  GER  UK  FR 
111 
-0.9138 
(-10.36)(a) 
 -0.1068 
(-1.42) 
  
 
  
 
112 
0.0613 
(1.79) 
  
 
  0.0338 
 (1.33) 
 -0.0853 
(-1.74) 
121 
-1.7730 
(-4.00) 
 -0.3494 
(-2.47) 
  
 
 -0.2876 
(-2.83) 
122 
0.2998 
(2.01) 
 0.2364 
 (3.14) 
 0.3158 
(3.85) 
 0.4582 
(5.74) 
111 
-0.5086 
(-4.07) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
112 
0.0512 
 (1.71) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
121 
-1.1043 
(-1.87) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
122 
-0.2876 
(-1.98) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
211 
 
 
  
 
 -0.2258 
 (-3.08) 
  
 
212 
   
 
 0.1022 
(3.95) 
  
 
221 
   0.2666 
 (1.91) 
 -0.1915 
 (-3.49) 
 -0.3235 
(-3.13) 
222 
   
 
  
 
 0.1110 
(1.39) 
311 
 
 
  -0.3236 
 (-4.20) 
  
 
 -0.4059 
(-5.13) 
312 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 -0.0544 
(-1.12) 
        
Φ11 
0.2488 
 (3.15) 
  
 
 0.2238 
(3.02) 
  
 
Φ12 
0.1640 
(2.15) 
  
 
 0.0702 
(0.84) 
  
 
Φ21 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 0.3974 
(5.21) 
Φ22 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 0.1969 
(2.40) 
1 
0.1245 
(1.09) 
  0.3725 
(4.63) 
 0.9607 
 (8.74) 
 0.2025 
(3.55) 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2007                                        Volume 6, Number 3 
 43 
2 
-2.0981 
( -3.57) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
1 
0.0756 
 (8.57) 
 0.2313 
(8.58) 
  0.0710 
(5.79) 
 0.3385 
(4.99) 
2 
 0.0595 
 (2.79) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
3 
1.5527 
(8.57) 
 1.1964 
(8.58) 
 0.9311 
(2.00) 
  0.7385 
(8.56) 
Aa11+g11 
 
 
  
 
 -0.2790 
(-2.05) 
  -0.9096 
(-7.48) 
Aa22 +g22 
-0.6156 
 (-1.85) 
 -0.8246 
 (-8.95) 
  
 
  -0.8992 
(-3.38) 
Aa33+g 33 
 
   
  
 
 -0.9941 
 (-52.37) 
  
 
g 11 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 -0.8381 
(-5.13) 
g 22 
-0.7092 
(-2.37) 
  -0.9273 
 (-15.44) 
  
 
 -0.8741 
(-2.95) 
g 33 
 
 
  
 
 -0.9253 
 (-15.47) 
  
 
Notes: 
(a) t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
Table 2: 
Least Squares Estimation Of The Risk Premium Associated To Macroeconomic Uncertainty. 
Full Sample: 1986:02-1998:04(A)(B) 
0 1 2 3 4ln D FD FD F t+1 t+1t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
t+1 2 2
y yt m m tt+1 m m
t
S
PRM   + + u
F
       
 
     
 
 
  ESP/DEM   FRF/DEM  GBP/DE
M 
 
C  
-0.0017 
(-1.03) 
  
-0.0032* 
(-1.88) 
 
-0.0033 
(-0.66) 
 
PRM(-1)(c)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
0.1565* 
(1.87) 
 
2ˆ SPSP ym   
-0.0541* 
(-2.80) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ˆ GER GERy m   
0.0047 
(0.48) 
  
0.0089* 
(1.76) 
 
0.0200 
(1.16) 
 
2ˆ FRm   
 
 
  
0.0042 
(0.83) 
 
 
 
 
ˆ FR FRy m   
 
 
  
0.0432* 
(1.98) 
 
 
 
 
2ˆ UKm   
 
 
  
 
 
 
-0.0011 
(-0.02) 
 
R2  0.053   0.051  0.034  
Adj. R2  0.040   0.031  0.014  
COR(1)(d)  0.37   0.32  0.87  
COR(12)(d)  0.73   0.16  0.47  
ARCH(6)(e)  0.63   0.02  0.34  
Notes: 
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(a) t-statistics in parentheses 
(b) An asterisk denotes a coefficient significant at the 10 % level 
(c) PRM(-1) denotes the lagged risk premium 
(d) P-value of Breusch-Godfrey test statistic for residual serial correlation  up to lag order p. 
(e) Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity test. ARCH(6) is the p-value of LM test statistic. 
 
 
Table 3:(a) 
Least Squares Estimation Of The Risk Premium Associated To Policy Uncertainty. 
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
0 1 2ln _ _ 2
t+1
t t t tt+1
t
S
PRM   IR SPR  IR SPR u
F
  
 
     
 
 
 
  ESP/DEM   FRF/DEM  GBP/DEM  
C  
-0.0061 
(-1.83)   
-0.0016 
(-1.46)  
0.0242 
(1.25) 
 
IR_SPR  
0.4651 
(1.81)   
0.8758 
(1.87)  
-1.5313 
(-0.9) 
 
IR_SPR2  
-10.017 
(-2.33)   
-101.11 
(-2.84)  
6.3577 
(0.13) 
 
Policy 
Uncertainty(b) 
 0.022   0.002  0.022 
 
R2  0.144   0.223  0.144  
Adj. R2  0.109   0.192  0.109  
COR(1)(c)  0.87   0.24  0.53  
COR(12)  0.90   0.59  0.30  
ARCH(6)(d)  0.16   0.64  0.57  
Notes: 
(a) t-statistics in parentheses  
(b) P-value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis:H0: 1 = 2=0. 
(c) P-value of Breusch-Godfrey test statistic for residual serial correlation  up to lag order p 
(d) Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity test. ARCH(6) is the p-value of LM test statistic. 
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Table 4: 
Least Squares Estimation Of The Risk Premium Equation (a) 
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln _ _ 2 D FD FD F t+1 t+1t+1 t+1t+1 t+1
t+1 2 2
y yt t t m m tt+1 m m
t
S
PRM   IR SPR  IR SPR +  + + u
F
         
 
      
 
 
  ESP/DEM   FRF/DEM  GBP/DEM  
C  
-0.0080 
(-1.62)   
-0.0003 
(-0.05)  
0.0185 
(0.18)  
IR_SPR  
0.4970 
(1.88)   
1.0438 
(2.00)  
-1.5600 
(-0.81)  
IR_SPR2  
-9.866 
(-2.22)   
-98.427 
(-2.56)  
-0.8508 
(-0.02) 
 
 
2ˆ SPSP ym   
0.0152 
(0.39)   
 
  
  
ˆ GER GERy m   
0.0121 
(0.86)   
0.0096 
(1.11)  
0.0316 
(1.02) 
 
 
2ˆ FRm   
 
   
-0.0061 
(-0.32)  
 
  
ˆ FR FRy m   
 
   
0.0409 
(0.69)  
 
  
2ˆ UKm   
 
   
 
  
0.1704 
(1.35)  
Policy  
Uncertainty(b) 
 
 
0.076 
 
  
 
0.040 
 
 
 
0.009 
 
 
Fundamental  
Uncertainty(c)  
 
 
0.636 
 
  
 
0.666 
 
 
 
0.249 
 
 
R2  0.160   0.249  0.194  
Adj. R2  0.089   0.167  0.143  
COR(1)(d)  0.76   0.25  0.35  
COR(12)  0.91   0.31  0.35  
ARCH(6)(e)  0.21   0.76  0.40  
Notes: 
(a) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(b) P-value of F-statistic for the  null hypothesis: H0: 1 = 2=0. 
(c) P-value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis: H0: 3 = 4= 5=6=0 
(d) P-value of Breusch-Godfrey test statistic for residual serial correlation  up to lag order p 
(e) Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity test. ARCH(6) is the p-value of LM test statistic. 
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Figure 1: 
Effects On The Risk Premium And The Variance Of Fiscal Policy 
Of A Change In Pt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
(a) Both variables are standardized  
(b) pt : probability that there might be a change in fiscal policy, is shown in the horizontal axis  
(c) f(0, 1, pt) is the non-linear function of pt measuring the effect on the risk premium of changes in pt, as in (18). 
(d)                                     is the non-linear function of pt providing the variance of fiscal policy  
 
 
Figure 2: 
Interest Rate Swap Spreads (IR_SPR) And Observed Risk Premium (PRM) 
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
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Figure 3: 
Observed Risk Premium, Fitted Risk Premium, Macroeconomic Uncertainty And Policy Uncertainty(a)(b)(c)  
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(a) Left column: Observed exchange risk premium versus the fitted value from the model in Table 4 
(b) Middle column: Observed exchange risk premium versus macroeconomic uncertainty contribution 
(c) Right column: Observed exchange risk premium versus  fiscal policy uncertainty contribution 
 
 
Figure 4: 
Probability Indicator For Spain, France And United Kingdom 
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
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Figure 5: 
Scatter Diagrams: Fitted Risk Premium (Horizontal Axis) Versus Observed Risk Premium, Policy And Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty Contribution (a)(b)(c). 
Sample: 1994:01-1998:04 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation
(d) 
0.40 0.58 0.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation
(d)
 0.35 0.32 0.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation
(d)
 0.41 0.19 0.85 
 
Notes: 
(a) Left column: observed risk premium versus the fitted risk premium from the model in Table 4 
(b) Middle column: Macroeconomic uncertainty contribution versus  the fitted risk premium 
(c) Right column: Policy uncertainty contribution versus the fitted risk premium 
(d) Correlation between variables in scatter diagrams 
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